An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts
Ines MacHo-Stadler, J. David Perez-Castrillo, Richard WattISBN: 0199243255; 978-0-19924-325-9;
A textbook on optimal contract theory, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals or organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics: *Moral Hazard--when the asymmetry arises after the contract has been signed *Adverse Selection--when the agent has relevant private infromation before the contract is signed; and *Signalling--when the informed part is able to reveal private information through behaviour before the agreement is...
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